Strategic Security as a New Academic Discipline by Greaves, Ph.D, Sheldon
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 1
Number 1 Volume 1, No. 1: November
2008
Article 2
Strategic Security as a New
Academic Discipline
Sheldon Greaves, Ph.D
Henley- Putnam University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security
Law Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons
pp. 7-20
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greaves, Ph.D, Sheldon. "Strategic Security as a New Academic
Discipline." Journal of Strategic Security 1, no. 1 (2010) : 7-20.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.1.1.2
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol1/iss1/2
Strategic Security as a New Academic Discipline
Author Biography
Dr. Sheldon Greaves is an expert in the history, language, literature,
religion, and material cultures of the Near East. He has studied this
region for over twenty-five years and currently teaches courses in
religious radicalism and covert organizations. Dr. Greaves is a co-founder
of Henley- Putnam University, joining the original team in 1997. He is
currently the Chief Academic Officer. In addition to his academic studies,
Dr. Greaves developed courses and degree programs for the University,
as well as broke new ground by helping to articulate the philosophical
basis for securing state approval for degrees in executive protection,
which had never before been granted for that field as a discrete
academic discipline. Dr. Greaves is an accomplished linguist, having
learned more than a dozen languages. He is also an expert on non-
traditional education and research methods, and has been active in many
areas of adult education, serving on the Board of the Society for Amateur
Scientists from 2001 to 2004 and briefly starting and running an
educational software company. He taught his first online course in 1992
through AOL on "The Dead Sea Scrolls." Dr. Greaves is a member of the
Association for Intelligence Officers. He received his Ph.D. in Near
Eastern Studies from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1996.
Abstract
The creation of Henley-Putnam University was an effort to create an
academic institution for the purpose of offering degree programs in
intelligence management, counterterrorism, and personal protection;
subjects that arguably did not exist as academic disciplines when the
school was conceived. The experience of two of the co-founders of the
school, Nirmalya Bhowmick and Dr. Michael Corcoran, indicated that the
training of officers tasked with vital security and intelligence work was
carried out by partnering young officers with a training officer to help
the new officer learn on the job. The effectiveness of this training
depended to a great extent on the competence or interest of the training
officer, as well as the types of jobs the new officer was given. The
resulting training often lacked consistency and proper coverage. When
Bhowmick began comparing notes with colleagues in similar agencies
from other countries, he discovered that their experiences mirrored
his.By contrast, Corcoran's experience with the US Secret Service
includedmonths of training at the Treasury School and additional
training atQuantico, VA, that included training usually given to FBI and
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Green Beret personnel—training that did not map neatly to the needs of
a Secret Service agent. But once the new agents finished this training,
they were not a training officer or officers as they began their new
assignments. This meant that they were often left to their own devices
when it came to figuring out how to manage tasks, such as intelligence
collection, that had not been fully covered by their training. The
experiences of Bhowmick and Corcoran were key to conceiving and
writing the curricula for the university. The curricular development was
also informed by a reassessment of the needs of the intelligence,
counterterrorism, and protection officer, which continues to this day.
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Discipline
Sheldon Greaves, Ph.D.
The creation of Henley-Putnam University was an effort to create an aca-
demic institution for the purpose of offering degree programs in intelli-
gence management, counterterrorism, and personal protection; subjects 
that arguably did not exist as academic disciplines when the school was 
conceived. The experience of two of the co-founders of the school, Nirma-
lya Bhowmick and Dr. Michael Corcoran, indicated that the training of 
officers tasked with vital security and intelligence work was carried out by 
partnering young officers with a training officer to help the new officer 
learn on the job. The effectiveness of this training depended to a great 
extent on the competence or interest of the training officer, as well as the 
types of jobs the new officer was given. The resulting training often lacked 
consistency and proper coverage. When Bhowmick began comparing 
notes with colleagues in similar agencies from other countries, he discov-
ered that their experiences mirrored his.
By contrast, Corcoran's experience with the US Secret Service included 
months of training at the Treasury School and additional training at 
Quantico, VA, that included training usually given to FBI and Green Beret 
personnel—training that did not map neatly to the needs of a Secret Ser-
vice agent. But once the new agents finished this training, they were not a 
training officer or officers as they began their new assignments. This 
meant that they were often left to their own devices when it came to figur-
ing out how to manage tasks, such as intelligence collection, that had not 
been fully covered by their training. The experiences of Bhowmick and 
Corcoran were key to conceiving and writing the curricula for the univer-
sity. The curricular development was also informed by a reassessment of 
the needs of the intelligence, counterterrorism, and protection officer, 
which continues to this day.
In this paper, I will examine some of the insights that have emerged from 
this process. The process of planning the university has taken many twists 
and turns since it was originally conceived in 1993. The threat environ-
ment, the marketplace, shifts in legislation and policy related to intelli-
gence and terrorism and, of course, the 9/11 attacks have created an 
environment of profound and radical changes in how Americans and their 
government view security issues. One of the most important changes is 
the post-9/11 establishment of "Homeland Security" as an academic 
proto-discipline whose scope and definition remain a matter of debate.
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This paper will suggest that the time has indeed come for a new academic 
discipline, but one that is more encompassing than the terrorism-centric 
understanding of "Homeland Security" as it is currently understood by 
the US Government and defined in its National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. We are calling this new discipline "Strategic Security," which 
consists of three sub-disciplines of intelligence, counterterrorism, and 
protection. We will further suggest, as others have done, that the creation 
of an educational standard is essential to improving the nation's ability to 
respond intelligently and appropriately to security threats. The curricu-
lum behind that standard should be based on those aspects of intelligence 
and its allied fields that will equip practitioners to address the full range 
of security issues.
The founding and development of Henley-Putnam University1 grew out of 
a number of insights regarding common methods of training clandestine 
officers worldwide, as well as the changing overall threat picture of the 
post-Cold War world. In the early 90's, these insights gradually coalesced 
into the clear need for establishing a set of three academic disciplines with 
their own distinct degree programs: Intelligence Management, Terror-
ism/Counterterrorism Studies, and Personal Protection Management. 
Creating these degree programs would have the effect of defining these 
academic disciplines independent of larger, tributary subjects such as 
management, criminal justice, public administration, area studies, politi-
cal science, etc.
1  The idea and concept of Henley-Putnam University was conceived in 1993 after 
the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center Towers. The planning and 
design of the curriculum began in 1995. An interim, CA State approved, postsec-
ondary college was applied for and was granted, followed by State approval in 
1998 for non-degree vocational education programs. The same year the founders 
of the school applied for a degree granting University under the name of Califor-
nia University of Protection and Intelligence Management (CUPIM). The Univer-
sity was registered with the Secretary of the State of CA on August 20th, 2001. 
CUPIM received its approval to operate shortly thereafter. The Protection Man-
agement, Intelligence Management and Terrorism/Counterterrorism Studies 
degrees were approved by the State of California in 2003. CUPIM changed its 
name to Henley-Putnam University in 2007, which was the same year it was 
nationally accredited by the Distance Education and Training Council (DETC).
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The end of the Cold War brought a moment of confusion as to what 
would replace the vanished Soviet threat. The first bombing of the World 
Trade Center in 1993 along with other acts of terrorism suggested that 
disrupting terrorism, increasingly by non-state actors, should become 
the primary focus of major powers such as the United States. The period 
of transition that followed was not an easy one. The calls for a "peace div-
idend" had to be balanced against the emergence of a new, unfamiliar 
kind of enemy. Indeed, it is harder to imagine a starker contrast than that 
of a giant, strongly secular, nuclear Soviet superpower compared with a 
much smaller, deeply religious, non-state actor such as Al Qaeda. In ret-
rospect it is not surprising that Western intelligence and counterterror-
ism agencies found the transition difficult. One could argue that the 
continued strong reliance on large-scale military force in the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT) indicates persistent vestiges of Cold War thinking.
The GWOT as conducted up to this point embodies a number of object 
lessons, some positive, and some negative. The attacks of 9/11 and the 
aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were marked by accusations of 
failure on the part of several entities involved in national security and 
defense. Intelligence failures were blamed both for the success of the 9/
11 hijackers and for the negative outcomes in Iraq. The need for law 
enforcement to talk to intelligence and vice versa has led to improve-
ments along those lines, along with a furious debate about the preserva-
tion or sacrifice of civil liberties as the price of added security. The value 
of diplomatic, cultural, and economic tools, so-called "soft power," is 
reasserting itself as the U.S. relearns the counterinsurgency lessons of 
Vietnam and applies them not only in Iraq, but against the larger 
Islamist insurgency worldwide. The problems of national image and the 
need to secure the moral high ground became particularly apparent as 
the Abu Ghraib torture scandal emerged and replicated itself in other 
U.S. military installations and the CIA "extraordinary rendition" 
program.
The current thinking among most intelligence agencies is that the GWOT 
is far from over, and that the United States has yet to gain a decisive 
advantage over terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which has man-
aged to reconstitute itself. Likewise the Taliban are resurgent in Afghani-
stan, exerting increasing pressure on the Karzai government.
A full discussion of those lessons and the history behind them is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, an important take-away point for our 
purposes here is the immutable truth that the conduct of such a war will 
not be any better than the intelligence and practices used to inform the 
policy and decision makers. The quality of intelligence can be said to 
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constitute an upper bound on the average quality of decisions made.2 
Equally important for our purposes is that there were and are people in 
the government military, law enforcement, and intelligence apparatus 
whose expertise would have allowed us to avoid the mistakes that have 
set back our efforts against terrorism.
The Evolving Security Marketplace
Other developments, particularly in the wake of 9/11, have further com-
plicated the intelligence education picture. One of these is the establishing 
of the office of the Director of National Intelligence, whose task is to exer-
cise oversight of the sixteen government agencies involved in the collec-
tion of intelligence. In order to properly staff this large new organization, 
senior intelligence officers—most of them from the CIA—were brought in. 
This created a dearth of experienced officers and seriously weakened the 
institutional memory at the CIA, such that as of 2007 roughly 40% of all 
the employees at the CIA had been hired since 9/11.3
Another complication grew out of the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security. This post-9/11 agency has as its mission the preven-
tion of and recovery from terrorist attacks. However, by linking "home-
land security" and "counterterrorism" this has raised the concern that 
other equally salient threats to national security are being de-emphasized. 
This concern has been playing itself out in numerous arenas in an attempt 
to redefine Homeland Security more comprehensively and will be treated 
later.
As others have pointed out, the full acceptance of a subject such as Home-
land Security by academia is a sine qua non for considering it as an aca-
demic discipline. That has not yet taken place. Much of the resistance to 
accepting Homeland Security as a new discipline grows out of the fuzzy 
boundaries surrounding it. Critics point out that many of the courses fea-
tured in Homeland Security programs were imported from other disci-
2  An excellent discussion of the recovery of the Intelligence Community in the 
wake of these failures is provided by the remarks of Dr. Thomas Fingar "Remarks 
and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence For Analysis & Chair-
man, National Intelligence Council" at the 2008 INSA Analytic Transformation 
Conference, Orlando, Florida, September 4, 2008. The text of his remarks can be 
found at http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20080904_speech.pdf.
3  Fred Rustmann, "The Reorganization of the Intelligence Community". Telecon-
ference Briefing, 15 June 2007. Audio file downloadable from 
http://www.henley-putnam.edu/templates/hpu/downloadables/audio/
Rustmann_15June2007.mp3
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plines and that there has not, as yet, been a fully agreed-upon set of core 
foundation courses upon which the discipline can build. Others consider 
Homeland Security a passing fad out of which a more serious program 
will emerge, probably as a subdiscipline of National Security.4
Another major change is the rise of the Chief Security Officer in private 
corporate boardrooms.
There is a growing recognition among corporate leadership that security 
is not just an overhead cost. It is a critical part of a company's competi-
tiveness. In addition, recent legislation such as the USA Patriot Act and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has created a new regulatory environment for cor-
porate America in areas ranging from information security to the storage 
and sale of chemicals—all intended to improve security in America's cor-
porate and commercial sector.
Other indicators of increased interest in security among the corporate 
sector include the rise of periodicals to serve this market. CSO magazine 
began five years ago and already has over 25,000 readers. A growing 
number of private organizations provide training and certification in pri-
vate security. ASIS International is the largest of these, with over 35,000 
members. They hold hundreds of conferences and events related to corpo-
rate security, and offer educational resources for members wishing to 
recertify as Certified Protection Professional (CPP), Professional Certified 
Investigator (PCI), and Physical Security Professional (PSP).
The growth in security awareness at the boardroom level is also found at 
levels of business and government that in years past would never have 
considered security as part of their mandate. Local police departments are 
starting to form counterterrorism units and intelligence bureaus. This has 
created not only a demand for more training, but an evolving debate 
about the propriety of using the tools of intelligence in a law enforcement 
context.
Finally, there is the rapid rise of the independent contractor in carrying 
out intelligence functions once performed by the Government. This devel-
opment is probably the most controversial, as it raises many questions 
regarding the qualifications of contractors, ethics and accountability, as 
4  Robinson, Randall L. The Homeland Security Academic Environment. A Review 
of Current Activities and Issues for Consideration. A report prepared for 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM J7, Homeland Security and Defense Education 
Consortium, 26 September 2007. Contract No. SP0-700-00-D-3180, CBRNIAC 
Task No. 498, Delivery Order 378. See footnote 3, page 12.
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well as their ability to protect classified information and resist penetra-
tion or suborning by opposition. Much of what is being reported on the 
privatization of intelligence activities focuses on the high cost of such con-
tractors. Furthermore, this new trend fragments the conduct of intelli-
gence, security, and related activities into sectors of varying—or absent—
accountability to the standard mechanisms of government oversight. In 
such circumstances, it is reasonable to question the training and qualifi-
cations of persons hired to perform these duties.
The Problem: The Making of an Intelligence Officer
The founder of Henley-Putnam University, Nirmalya Bhowmick, had 
enjoyed a successful career in intelligence and counterterrorism opera-
tions in India and other parts of South Asia. A large fraction of his train-
ing was done on the job, carried out by a more senior officer to whom he 
had been assigned. Although training in the field like this kept the focus 
on the pragmatic rather than the theoretical, it took longer to create a 
truly well-trained officer. Moreover, sometimes there is a real need for the 
theoretical and abstract in the education of someone engaged in the activ-
ities of intelligence, counterterrorism, or protection, to say nothing of the 
value of learning in an environment where "rookie mistakes" will not have 
dire consequences.
Another problem with this method of training was that the education of 
young officers and operatives, taken together, proved to be highly 
uneven—with significant gaps of knowledge that varied from person to 
person. The quality of training depended on the teaching ability of the 
mentoring officer. If one happened to be assigned to an officer who was 
unskilled or unenthusiastic about such things, it would obviously take 
that person longer to become truly qualified. And the designation of 
"qualified" was arguably an arbitrary judgment in the absence of clearly 
stated educational and training standards. His inquiries of other opera-
tives and officers in other agencies, both domestic and foreign, indicated 
that his was not a unique experience.
In the years since the 1980s, when Mr. Bhowmick was active in the field, 
some changes have come about. Internal training in any given agency has 
improved dramatically. However, there remain significant differences 
and gaps when the training of one agency is compared with another, and 
one can still find unevenness in training within a given agency or organi-
zation. This is naturally due to differing missions and legal boundaries 
within which individual agencies operate. That said, there is still an 
underlying substratum of expertise that can and should be expected of 
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anyone who works in intelligence, counterterrorism, or protection. In 
many other fields, there are systems of certification and standards of edu-
cation dictating what a legitimate practitioner of a field should know, 
whether it is law, medicine, plumbing, or teaching. One of the main objec-
tives of what became Henley-Putnam University was to develop and 
establish that educational standard.
The Nature of Emerging Disciplines
Fields that lack the imprimatur of academic establishments and the bod-
ies that approve and regulate them become "emerging" as they burst into 
the public consciousness in various ways. This often happens as part of a 
larger change in society, such as the growth of a new technology, a politi-
cal sea change, or socioeconomic phenomena. These fields are usually 
already in existence but are subsumed under a larger subject. For 
instance, the field of Criminal Justice used to be a sub-specialty of Sociol-
ogy until it expanded into something sufficiently large and complex that it 
needed its own discrete field of academic study. Another example is the 
field of Astronomy which for a long time was considered part of Meteorol-
ogy, until the pace and scope of discoveries in that field pulled it forever 
into a discipline of its own.
This brings us to "Homeland Security," which starts with its definition as 
stated in the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security:
… a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, 
and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur.5
In other words, the mission statement of the Department of Homeland 
Security, whose ranks many of the new academic programs seek to fill, 
mentions only counterterrorism as its province. Many in academia and 
elsewhere find this definition unsatisfactory. But while the interest in 
addressing terrorism is understandable given the historical context in 
which the DHS was brought into being, one must approach the expansion 
of the definition of Homeland Security with caution. As Robinson's report 
cited earlier states:
5  Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy f or Homeland Security, July 
2002, p. 2. PDF file is available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf.
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…one might argue that the current trend is to deem any activity 
that may have tangential negative societal security implications 
as having a nexus to homeland security. If the future of homeland 
security continues the trend toward a boundless view of the field, 
school administrators may struggle with determining the courses 
to be taught in a program that purports to prepare students for 
this new discipline.6
In other words, Homeland Security as a discipline has resisted the kind of 
focus needed to draw hard boundaries around it and from there, define 
the essence of what is to be taught to those seeking expertise. The nature 
of the subject tends towards an expansive, rather than a reduced and 
compact definition.
Our view is that such a definition becomes easier if one starts with funda-
mental skills, such as those found in the intelligence community. Intelli-
gence is not a new discipline as such. It has been part of the practice of 
statecraft and commercial enterprise from time immemorial. So while it is 
irresistible to point out the irony of referring to the "second oldest profes-
sion" as part of an emerging discipline, we must also acknowledge that the 
development of new technologies and the rise of new types of adversaries 
has created an environment in which intelligence—supplemented by pro-
tection and counterterrorism—have become even more vital to the 
defense of national interests. We submit that these three emerging disci-
plines should be considered together under a new cover term of Strategic 
Security.
What is Strategic Security?
Although "strategic security" is becoming a terme d'arte in different parts 
of the security world, it does not yet have a clear, agreed-upon definition. 
We choose not to define "security" as a state of safety or threat level. In 
practice, such ratings tell you little or nothing about how secure you are. 
Rather, we define "security" as an activity; as ongoing behaviors designed 
to forestall reasonable or probable threats.
Although the global threat spectrum includes such diverse dangers as nat-
ural disaster, economic upheaval, environmental degradation, terrorism 
and other forms of violent extremism, crime, social upheavals, chronic 
political corruption, and so forth, it must be noted that these threats also 
apply on global, national, regional, and even personal levels.
6  Robinson, ibid, page 11.
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The activity of Strategic Security depends on accurate, objective knowl-
edge, obtained in a timely fashion and skillfully acted upon. The intellec-
tual tools and tradecraft of intelligence, counterterrorism, and personal 
protection, properly applied, can provide the right information to the 
right policy makers or decision makers so that they may act in our collec-
tive best interests based upon the facts as they are seen at that moment.
But defining a field like Strategic Security and its component disciplines is 
not the same as establishing it in an academic or regulatory context. This 
kind of definition requires clear boundaries. One must clearly and 
cogently articulate the founding principles that inform the curricula used 
to train the field's experts. This establishes a consistent expectation of 
expertise which educational standards are designed to serve.
Post-9/11 and the Rush to Market
The effect of 9/11 on the field of intelligence and counterterrorism is per-
haps comparable to that of Sputnik on science education. Both events gal-
vanized the nation and propelled it in directions that directly responded 
to those events. In the case of Sputnik, educational programs seemed to 
come out of nowhere, all of which were calculated to turn out more scien-
tists and engineers that were considered necessary to preserve both 
national security and world prestige. By contrast the 9/11 attacks 
prompted a proliferation of terrorism and intelligence "experts" in the 
news stream, and a plethora of educational programs designed to serve 
the sudden demand for experts in intelligence, counterterrorism, and 
related fields.
The vast majority of these degree programs, however, were little more 
than re-tooled (and in some cases, merely re-named) programs in Public 
Administration, Criminal Justice, Management, and so forth with an 
emphasis in intelligence or counterterrorism or security.7 Very few pro-
grams have actually been created from the ground up to serve the needs of 
the intelligence professional. Even today there are almost no programs in 
counterterrorism. Personal Protection undergraduate and graduate 
degree programs are only available from Henley-Putnam.
The hybrid degrees that make up the bulk of educational programs are 
very closely tied to the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. 
While clearly speaking to the concerns of that moment, this definition is 
remarkably narrow in scope. As already noted, it excludes matters of nat-
7  Robinson, ibid, pp. 12–13.
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ural disaster, economic upheaval, pandemics, resource disruption, and 
many other factors whose effects are amplified by the interconnectedness 
between nations and new technologies that could conceivably disrupt the 
security of the United States.
This overemphasis on just one aspect of national security recalls the 
famous dictum that generals prepare to fight the previous war. Another 
weakness in this approach worth noting is that many of the programs 
flooding the academic marketplace are based, as noted above, on disci-
plines derived from the Criminal Justice mentality in which one does not 
respond until a crime has been committed. In order to be effective, educa-
tional programs that prepare their graduates to take their places in the 
Intelligence Community or its allied fields must instead focus on the pre-
vention of national security incidents and the deterrence of threats. Con-
sequence management should take its place behind training in preventive 
measures.
Although it is impossible to ignore the attacks of 2001—or 1993 for that 
matter—in the creation of a curriculum dedicated to strategic security, we 
have tried to resist the temptation to let those events serve as a seed crys-
tal around which the programs grew. The advantage of a field such as 
intelligence is that by its very nature it must expect the unexpected. 
Threats can take many forms, and this requires the intelligence profes-
sional to develop tools that can be applied to a wide range of information 
types and sources. To use a straightforward example, the tools of analysis 
include standard procedures and exercises designed to reveal and thereby 
factor out personal biases of the analyst. These are generic tools; they can 
be applied to just about any problem that is likely to cross an analyst's 
desk. Their usefulness does not go away when the problem swings away 
from terrorism to other kinds of threats.
Why Create New Academic Disciplines?
Traditionally, academic disciplines have served as forums within which 
the issues associated with those disciplines in an open manner. The 
demands of secrecy associated with Strategic Security have inhibited the 
kind of academic discussion found in other areas of study, but they have 
also kept it from harnessing the full power of the educational apparatus 
for training purposes. The efforts to bring public and private universities 
into the business of training Strategic Security professionals and estab-
lishing standards of education are further constrained by the lack of text-
books and other standardized materials. Instead, educators must rely on 
trade press publications, which go through a different process of selection 
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for publication and editing from books intended for the academic market. 
These materials can also have an uneven shelf life. Books can go out of 
print after a year or so, sometimes months, requiring rapid readjustments 
by any professor who happened to require one of these books on a course.
The other main source of materials from which educators can draw are 
documents issued by the Government agencies whose job it is to stay on 
top of developments. However, this source can be problematic due to the 
lack of consistent announcements and indexing of new Government docu-
ments when they are issued by their particular department or agency. 
Further, such documents are written for a variety of reasons, and in 
recent years there have been more reports of government reports being 
edited to remove or obscure politically difficult information. The same 
criticisms can also be leveled at independent research organizations and 
think tanks. This leaves the field of Strategic Security in great need of reg-
ular, standard educational publications that will always be around, 
updated as needed. This leads to a chicken-and-egg conundrum, for until 
you know what your curriculum is, you cannot write the textbooks needed 
to serve it.
Defining the Curriculum
Describing the curriculum for a practitioner of Strategic Security is a chal-
lenging task; of all the disciplines out there, it is hard to think of one that 
is more encompassing, more multi-disciplinary than "intelligence." It 
draws upon significant slices of history, science, humanities, language, 
mathematics, politics, economics and other fields in crafting the finished 
intelligence product. To that end, one could legitimately ask what, if any-
thing, makes intelligence, as well as its associated areas of counterterror-
ism and protection unique as fields of study. The answer to that can be 
expressed in a single word: Tradecraft.
Although traditionally "tradecraft" has referred to the nuts-and-bolts 
techniques more often associated with field espionage, in recent years the 
definition has expanded to include practices and techniques found in 
other related fields such as analysis, protection, and so forth. That said, 
tradecraft imbues the fields allied with Strategic Security their unique-
ness, and defines the essential skill sets that differentiate them from more 
generic studies of politics, economics, history, humanities, geography, 
and so on. It distinguishes standard hiring practices from the ability to 
recruit an asset, or the development of a research proposal versus the cre-
ation of an intelligence requirement.
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Conclusions
Much of the confusion clouding the discussion of educational standards 
and curricula for intelligence, counterterrorism, protection, and security 
professionals is due to the mission assigned to the Department of Home-
land Security and the definition of "homeland security" that flows from 
that definition. The department, understandably, is reluctant to expand 
that definition into realms that are already covered by other agencies and 
departments. Rather than attempt to untie this Gordian Knot, we propose 
to go around the problem and create a new cover term "strategic security" 
that encompasses not only the current official definition of homeland 
security, but also its allied fields and the professionals who work in them.
This new term informs the creation of a new educational curriculum and 
educational standard and hardens the boundaries around the definition 
of strategic security, emphasizing tradecraft over more general fields that 
happen to overlap areas of concern to intelligence, counterterrorism, and 
protection. The emphasis on tradecraft increases one's ability to respond 
to a wider variety of circumstances and scenarios because tradecraft has 
evolved out of a vast array of situations and applications. It also helps 
avoid the kind of rearview mirror mentality that prompts one to prepare 
for new threats in terms of previous ones.
Finally, by using a new concept to put homeland security at arm's length, 
we gain the latitude to create a clearly defined standard of education and 
training that will better prepare those professionals who must face the 
next challenges to our nation's security.
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